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68 E3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
I. FACTS
On June 6, 1993, the Golden Venture ran
aground off the shore of Queens in New York City.
Law enforcement officials first noticed a problem
around 1:45 a.m., when many of the Golden
Venture's passengers began congregating on the
beach after swimming from the grounded ship.' By
2:19 a.m., an array of law enforcement officials de-
scended upon the beach, which was eventually cor-
doned off. More than one hundred passengers re-
mained on the beached vessel, while approximately
two hundred swam to shore. About thirty passen-
gers fled into the surrounding community before the
police could set up barricades. The great majority
of the passengers, who turned out to be illegal Chi-
nese immigrants, waited for the police instead of
attempting to flee inland.
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") in-
stituted exclusion hearings against petitioners and
the other passengers of the Golden Venture. The
BIA entered a final exclusion order for petitioners,
concluding that the aliens had not effected an entry.
Effecting an entry would have afforded the petition-
ers a proceeding with the higher due process require-
ments of deportation rather than the more summary
exclusion proceedings provided those who have not
actually entered the United States. Applying § 1101
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INR')
2
and previous cases dealing with the INA 3 the BIA
required three elements to be satisfied before rec-
ognizing that an entry had occurred.4 First; the alien
must have had an actual physical presence within
the territorial limits of the United States. Second,
he or she either must have been inspected and ad-
mitted by an immigration officer or must have ac-
tually and intentionally evaded inspection at the
nearest entry point. Finally, he or she must have been
free from official restraint.5
I Yang v. Maughn, 68 F3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995).
28 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
3 Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1990);
Matter of Patel, 20 I. & N. Dec. 368 (BIA 1991).
4 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1545.
-168 F.3d at 1545 (citing Correa v. Thornburgh, 901
F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990)).
6MatterofG-, 20 1. & N. Dec 764 (BIA 1993).
7Id.
The BIA concluded that petitioners did not sat-
isfy the entry requirements of the INA. Because
petitioners had actually landed on the beach, they
satisfied the physical presence element of the test
for entry. However, petitioners prevailed on the sec-
ond element of the entry test because the BIA in-
ferred an intent to evade immigration officials. The
BIA found that participation in a smuggling scheme,
and arrival without travel documents which would
have let petitioners stay in the United States, cre-
ated an inference that intentional evasion would have
occurred had the petitioner's transportation not been
beached.6 The BIA further stated that section 291
of the INA allowed the agency to shift the burden
of proving the third element, freedom from official
restraint, to petitioners.7 At the exclusion hearings,
several detainees either implicitly or explicitly stated
that they had the opportunity to leave the beach.
This alleged opportunity to leave, as well as the es-
cape of approximately thirty passengers into the
surrounding community, went directly to the ques-
tion of freedom from official restraint.' The BIA,
however, concluded that although some passengers
were able to leave the beach, the police cordon es-
tablished by law enforcement officials constituted
official restraint.9 The BIA held that petitioners did
not meet the burden of proving the third element
of the entry test, hence, that they had not entered
the United States.
More than one hundred passengers, including
petitioners, filed habeas corpus petitions challeng-
ing their detention in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Be-
cause the cases presented similar issues, the district
court consolidated them. Several petitioners filed
individual motions for partial summary judgement.
One motion, petitioner Chung's, was granted when
the district court held he had effected an entry into
R Several petitioners said that they were too exhausted
to move after reaching the beach. One petitioner said that
he reached a fence, changed his clothes, and waited for
the police. Another petitioner stated that he "almost
walked to the street" before an officer approached him
approximately thirty minutes after he reached the shore.
Yang, 68 F3d at 1544.
9 MatterofG-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 368 (BIA 1993).
the United States under the INA.'0 In doing so, the
district court concluded that the BIA incorrectly
applied existing law in two areas.
First, the district court held that the BIA erred
in requiring physical presence on dry land. The dis-
trict court, relying on United States v. Vasilatos,"
concluded that an entry could occur when an alien
merely enters the territorial waters of the United
States.'2 The district court concluded that Mr.
Vasilatos had "entered" the United States in Phila-
delphia even before the ship had even entered the
harbor. Implicitly, the Vasilatos court recognized
some form of entry when reaching territorial wa-
ters.13 The district court found that the reasoning of
Vasilatos was binding upon the Third Circuit and
that merely arriving in the territorial waters of the
United States satisfied the first element of the entry
test.
14
The district court stated that the BIAs second
mistake of law was its improper assigning the peti-
tioners the burden of proof It held that the INA
"required [each petitioner] to establish only that he
had made a physical entry into the United States at
a point distant from an inspection station."" The
district court further found that petitioners satis-
fied their burden of proving an entry into the United
States. Moreover, it denied the government's request
for reconsideration on June 6, 1995. The district
court's order required deportation hearings against
petitioners to begin within ten days. The govern-
ment appealed.
II. HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court and remanded in favor of
the government, stating that the BIAs conclusions
of law were correct. The Third Circuit held that for
entry within the meaning of the INA to occur, an
alien must reach dry land. The Third Circuit found
10Chung v. Reno, 886 F.Supp. 1172, 1184 (M.D. Pa.
1995).
u United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.
1954).
'2Chung, 886 F. Supp. at 1179.
1 In Vasilatos, a Greek sailor was convicted of enter-
ing the United States after having been deported. Vasilatos
lied about having ever been deported when his ship made
a port of call in Philadelphia. He never left the ship while
in Philadelphia, but jumped ship after it put in at New
York. Vasilatos challenged venue when his case was heard
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. United States v.
Vasilatos, 209 E2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954).
N Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.
that Vasilatos,'6 which ruled that entry occurs at the
territorial waters of the United States was decided
under immigration laws no longer in force." Exist-
ing immigration law pointed the court toward the
conclusion that merely crossing into territorial wa-
ters of the United States is not enough to effect an
entry under the INA. Additionally, the court held
that proper deference must be given to an agency's
statutory interpretation. Therefore, the BIA's inter-
pretation of the INA allowed the agency to shift the
burden of proof to petitioners to prove all the re-
quirements of entry before they were entitled to a
deportation hearing.
III. APPLICATION/ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of
whether petitioners were entitled to a deportation
hearing or a simple exclusionary hearing. A depor-
tation hearing guarantees full due process, while an
exclusionary hearing has fewer due process guaran-
tees. If petitioners were found to have entered the
United States, they would be entitled to the depor-
tation hearing with its full due process guarantees.18
The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating
that, in accordance with Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council,9 an agency's statu-
tory interpretation must be accorded deference
when Congress has not spoken directly on the issue.
Yang dealt with § 291 of the INA,20 which states:
Whenever any person ... makes application
for admission, or otherwise attempts to enter
the United States, the burden of proof shall be
upon such person to establish that he... is not
subject to exclusion under any provision of this
chapter.2'
The district court shifted this burden of proof back
to the government, concluding that the government
'sChung, 886 ESupp. at 1185.
16 United States v. Vasilatos, 209 E2d 195 (3d Cir.
1954).
.'7 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.
'For a discussion of the due process benefits avail-
able in deportation proceedings and absent from exporta-
tion proceedings, see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982). See also Robert D. Ahlgren, Procedural Due Pro-
cess in Exclusion/Deportation, 964 PLI/Corp. 71 (1996).
19 Chevron US-A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
208 U.S.C. § 1361 (1952).
Z Yang, 68 E3d at 1546 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1361
(1952)).
was in a better position to know how and when an
alien had been placed into custody. 2 The Third Cir-
cuit held that the district court's shifting of the bur-
den of proof back to the BIA was unreasonable in
light of Chevron.'3 Hence, in the Third Circuit the
BIA's interpretation of the INA would stand in the
absence of Congressional direction, so long as the
agency's interpretation was a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.
24
In holding that petitioners satisfied the first ele-
ment of the test for entry, the district court con-
cluded that presence in territorial waters of the
United States was enough to constitute an entry. The
Third Circuit rejected this conclusion. It relied upon
the Second and Fourth Circuit's requirement of a
landing upon solid ground to effect entry25 Because
Vasilatos had been decided under a repealed stat-
ute, the Third Circuit found that the district court
improperly relied upon its holding.26 The Vasilatos
court explicitly stated its decision was governed by
immigration laws existing before Congress enacted
the INA.17 The Third Circuit concluded that the
Vasilatos court failed to recognize that Congress in-
tended the 1952 enactment of the INA to supercede
all existing immigration laws."8 By interpreting en-
try into the United States according to a definition
in the repealed statute, the Vasilatos court effectively
ignored the definition provided in the newly enacted
INA.2
9
The INA currently defines entry as "any com-
ing of an alien into the United States, from a foreign
port or place or from an outlying possession. '30 In
Yang, the Third Circuit found that a strict reading
of the statutory language was required because the
term "United States" had multiple definitions.31 The
Third Circuit used the language of the INA,32 which
reads in part, "[t]he term 'United States' . . . when
used in a geographical sense, means the continental
United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam,
'Chung, 886 F. Supp. at 1185.
"3Yang, 68 F.3d at 1546-1547 (citing Chevron US-A.
Ina v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
24 68 F.3d at 1546-1547.
2'Xin-ChangZhangv. Slatteiy, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.
1995); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir.
1995).
"6The Immigration Act of 1917, 8 U.S.C. § 173 (re-
pealed).
27 Vasilatos, 209 F.2d at 197.
28Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548-1549.
'The Immigration Act of 1917, 8 U.S.C. § 173 (re-
pealed) read in part: "[t]he term 'United States' shall be
construed to mean the United States, and any waters, ter-
and the Virgin Islands of the United States,"33 to
conclude that "United States" within the INA re-
quired a physical presence on the continental United
States, not merely entering the territorial waters.
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that for an alien
to enter the United States, he must reach dry land.
3
The second element of the entry test, inspec-
tion and admission by an immigration officer or in-
tentional evasion of such an officer, was not at issue
in Yang.3 However, the Third Circuit noted that
because the first element required arrival on the
continental United States, the second element could
occur only on dry land.36 Official inspection and
admission would not occur when a vehicle or ship
crosses territorial waters of the United States. In-
stead, admission would occur at inspection stations
within the United States. Because these stations are
on dry land, the evasion (or inspection and admis-
sion) must also take place on dry land.
37
To determine whether petitioners were free
from official restraint for purposes of satisfying the
third element of the entry test, the Third Circuit
expressly rejected a Ninth Circuit decision, United
States v. Martin-Plascencia.38 In Martin-Plascencia, a
Mexican juvenile attempted to evade immigration
officials at the port of entry in San Ysidro, Califor-
nia.39 The juvenile crawled through a hole in a chain-
link fence which was out of the view of immigra-
tion officials on duty. The Ninth Circuit held that
the juvenile had entered the United States within
the meaning of the INA.40TheThird Circuit rejected
this holding, stating:
[wlhen an alien attempts to enter the United
States, the mere fact that he or she may have
eluded the gaze of law enforcement for a brief
period of time after having come upon United
States territory is insufficient, in and of itself,
to establish freedom from official restraint.
41
ritory, or other place subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
except the Isthmian Canal Zone .... "30See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).
3168 F.3d at 1549.
328 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(38).
338 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(38).
3Yang 68 F.3d at 1550.
3-68 E3d at 1549.
3668 F.3d at 1549.
37 Id.
31 United States v. Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1976).39 Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d at 1317.
40532 F.2d at 1317.
41Yang, 68 F.3d at 1550.
The Third Circuit concluded that none of the peti-
tioners had satisfied their burden of proving that
they were free from official restraint.42 The court
noted that shortly after the Golden Venture ran
aground, the beach was bustling with law enforce-
ment personnel. Petitioners were not free to "go at
large and mix with the general population," a factor
the Third Circuit saw as indicative of restraint.43 In
fact, all petitioners had been apprehended shortly
after they set foot on the beach. The fact that peti-
tioners were free from official restraint for a short
time was not dispositive. Hence, no individual peti-
tioner met the third element of the entry test. In
concluding that entry had not been effected under
the INA, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's granting of partial summary judgement and
order for a deportation hearing.
CONCLUSION
The INA may be Congress' attempt to standard-
ize immigration law, but the application of the INA
among the circuits has been inconsistent. The cen-
tral issue in Yang was the level of due process the
BIA must provide to aliens. If an alien enters the
United States, he or she is entitled to an adversarial
hearing with full due process guarantees. If entry
does not occur, an alien is subject to an exclusionary
hearing of the type the BIA sought in Yang, with
few due process guarantees. Although the three-part
test for entry is uniformly accepted in all circuits,
the application of the individual elements to spe-
cific facts has been far from uniform. The practitio-
ner should note that the circuits do not agree on the
circumstances which satisfy the first element, the
physical presence requirement. Likewise, the circuits
apply the third element required for entry, freedom
from official restraint, inconsistently. In fact, the
Third Circuit is expressly at odds with the Ninth
Circuit on the issue. Finally, the practitioner should
note that Yang allows the BIA to shift the burden of
proof on proving freedom from official restraint from
the government to aliens. This has great practical
significance in cases such as Yang. In close factual
questions, the BIA must make its decision accord-
ing to where the burden lies.
Because of the emphasis on deference to an
agency's own statutory interpretation in Chevron and
in other judicial reviews of agency decisions, the BIA
has the authority to adjudicate claims in a manner
more uniform than the federal circuit. However, the
BIA may reach decisions too quickly. Exclusionary
hearings may have the benefit of speed and low cost,
but the result is a loss in due process guarantees
petitioners would have received in a deportation
hearing. One thing is certain after Yang: within the
Third Circuit, at least, the BIA appears to have wide
latitude in its actions concerning aliens, so long as
the agency's statutory interpretations remain "rea-
sonable" in the eyes of the judiciary.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Charles Ford
4268 E3d at 1550.
43 Id. (quoting Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 E2d 1166,
1172 (2d Cir. 1990)).
